International Capital Flows and World Output Gains

We develop a two-country overlapping-generations model with domestic financial frictions and show that cross-country differences in financial development explain three recent patterns of international capital flows. In our model, domestic financial frictions distort the interest rates and production efficiency in the less financially developed country. Capital flows not only lead to cross-country resource reallocation, but also trigger within-country resource reallocation among firms. From the efficiency perspective, full capital mobility raises the world output higher than under international financial autarky. If the mobility of either financial capital or foreign direct investment is restricted, the world output may be lower.Capital account liberalization, financial frictions, financial development, foreign direct investment, world output gains

International Capital Flows and Aggregate Output

We develop a tractable multi-country overlapping-generations model and show that cross-country differences in financial development explain three recent empirical patterns of international capital flows. Domestic financial frictions in our model distort interest rates and aggregate output in the less financially developed countries. International capital flows help ameliorate the two distortions.International flows of financial capital and foreign direct investment a ect aggregate output in each country directly through affecting the size of aggregate investment. In addition, they affect aggregate output indirectly through affecting the composition of aggregate investment and the size of aggregate savings. Under certain conditions, the indirect effects may dominate the direct effects so that, despite "uphill" net capital flows, full capital mobility may raise the steady-state aggregate output in the poor country as well as raise world output. However, if foreign direct investment is restricted, "uphill" financial capital flows strictly reduce the steady-state aggregate output in the poor countries and it is more likely that the steady-state world output is lower than under international financial autarky.Capital account liberalization, financial frictions, financial development, foreign direct investment, world output gains

The Risk Alleviating Role of Interbank Market Lending in Central and Eastern European Countries

The banking sectors in several Central and Eastern European countries are characterized by a two-tier structure, in which a few large banks dominate the deposit market but are very inactive in the loan market with private borrowers, while many small banks engage in lending but have only small shares of the deposit market. The large banks act as net lenders in the interbank market, while small banks are net borrowers in the market. Typically, the former banks are incumbent institutions from pre-transition times, while the later are new institutions. In this paper, we ask whether this two-tier structure and the resulting interbank trade has any important risk alleviating effects on the performance of the banking sector. Specifically, we consider the effects on the lending activities of the small banks. We present a model of the credit market based on asymmetric information and moral hazard. Assuming that large banks have monitoring costs benefits compared to depositors regarding the lending activities of the other banks, we show that the two-tier structure induces small banks to engage in less risky lending activities than small banks that finance themselves predominantly in the deposit market. We test this and related hypotheses using financial statement data from banks in 10 EU accession candidate countries. This allows us to compare the financial activities of banks in countries where a two-tier structure prevails with those of small banks in markets where such a pattern is not observed. The results generally confirm the main hypothesis of the model.interbank market, bank risk, bank specialisation, transition economies

Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence

This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We compare the outcomes of bottom-up and top-down budget processes. It is often presumed that a top-down budget process leads to a smaller overall budget than a bottom-up budget process. Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) showed theoretically that this need not be the case. We test experimentally the theoretical predictions of their work. The evidence from these experiments lends strong support to their theory, both at the aggregate and the individual subject level.budget processes, voting equilibrium, experimental economics

A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Fiscal arrangements in a monetary union evidence from the US

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel W 164 (9) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Monetary policy coordination in the European monetary system

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman